1863
February 7, 1863 - Joseph E. Brown requests that the regiment be sent to Savannah to defend the city in case it is attacked.
May 7, 1863 - Clinton, Tenn.
MOUNT VERNON, May 24, 1863
General WILLCOX:
Captain Lysander [W.] Tulleys' reconnaissance indicates no serviceable artillery at Cumberland Gap. His detachment of 200 men was in plain sight, in easy cannon range, of the fortifications for some time, and no artillery was seen, except the large gun on the left-hand pinnacle, for which it is now said they have no ammunition, and was not manned at all. Captain Tulleys reports that the garrison, although entirely unaware of his presence until his command emerged from the forest in plain sight, evinced the utmost coolness. He formed line of battle in front of their works at the edge of the broken ground, and quietly awaited developments. They showed only about 600 men. He captured 2 privated and 4 horses, and mortally wounded 1 man of the Sixth Georgia Cavalry, being their picket on the Baptist Gap road. Their other pickets were so well posted that the parties sent to capture them failed. Our only loss was 1 horse abandoned in the mountains. The composure of the garrison, in awaiting developments, indicated first-class troops and supports close by. The pursuit, after our men commenced falling back, was ended by a volley from thirty of our rifles, which brought down 2 horses and several men. Captain Tulleys' detachment crossed four high and very steep mountains, and marched 40 miles in less than twenty-four hours. They had to lead their horses about half the whole distance.
SAMUEL A. GILBERT,
Colonel, Commanding
June 17, 1863 - HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF EAST TENNESSEE, Knoxville,
Lieutenant Colonel R. H. MOORE,
Commanding Fain's Georgia Regiment, Wartburg:
COLONEL:
The major-general commanding directs that you have four days' rations prepared immediately, and to fall back with your command to Jacksborough. Should the enemy succeed in crossing the mountain at Big Creek Gap, you will move your command so as to join your brigade at or near Clinton, Tenn.
I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
V. SHELIHA,
Chief of Staff
June 23, 1863 - Kingston
Colonel [G. T.] MAXWELL,
Loudon:
Captain Moore, at Wartburg, is instructed to rally a sufficient number of cavalry for the purpose of picketing all approaches to Wartburg, and give speedy information of movements of the enemy to Lieutenant-Colonel [R. H.] Moore, commanding Fain's Georgia regiment, now at Kingston, who, in his turn, will inform you by courier of what is going on. Furnish a copy of this to Lieutenant-Colonel Moore, at Kingston, and Captain Moore, in command of cavalry at Wartburg. Instruct them to organize at once an efficient line of couriers, and to press a sufficient number of good horses, if necessary, for that purpose.
V. SHELIHA,
Chief of Staff
Report of Major General William T. Martin, C. S. Army, commanding Longstreet's cavalry
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY IN EAST TENNESSEE, January 8, 1864
COLONEL:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the services rendered by the cavalry divisions of Brigadier-Generals Armstrong and Morgan, under my command. That the condition of the command when it devolved upon me may be understood, I beg leave to call attention briefly to services rendered by it immediately preceding its moving to East Tennessee:
In August last, having had for the first time in twelve months a short period of rest, the command moved to the front and took an active part in the skirmishers and battle at and near Chickamauga, fighting dismounted, with or on the flanks of the infantry during the battles. Soon after, with the exception of the First and Sixth Georgia Regiments, it moved up the Tennessee River and crossed near Washington, fighting or marching with short intervals of rest for six days. After the destruction of several railroad bridges and stockades, and of 800 of the enemy's wagons and 2,000 mules and a large amount of stores, and the capture of 1,200 prisoners and many mules, horses, and stores, it recrossed the river at Courtland, Ala., and from thence through a desolated country marched to Kingston, Ga., and thence to Parker's Ford, on the Little Tennessee River. With orders to take two days' rations and no wagons, the command crossed the river, and making a night march attacked Maryville at daylight, capturing 200 prisoners and routing a brigade of cavalry.
The next day it was moved toward Knoxville, and after fighting till after dark ran the entire cavalry of the enemy (four strong brigades with artillery, outnumbering us two to one) into the intrenchments opposite Knoxville.
The second day afterward the command was marched to a point below Louisville, and crossing the river marched to Knoxville, when it reported to Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
A few days afterward, the First and Sixth Georgia having reported to me for duty, the command moved upon Kingston by a forced march and made an ineffective attempt to take that place. The strength of the position, the weight of metal of their artillery, and the steadiness of the enemy's force there foiled our efforts. Major-General Wheeler, under whose immediate orders the foregoing movements were made, placed me in command and left to report to General Bragg on November 24 last.
On the 24th, I moved the command to Knoxville, and it was engaged in picketing and skirmishing with the enemy in front of that place, suffering greatly for forage.
On the 26th, I moved Harrison's brigade, of Armstrong's division, and Russell's brigade, of Morgan's division, under command of Brigadier-General Morgan, across the Holston below Knoxville to participate in a demonstration upon the enemy's lines there. The men were dismounted and moved with the infantry on its left flank. Russell's brigade was warmly engaged, and drove the enemy from his rifle-pits upon the side of a difficult ridge. Colonel Thomas Harrison, on the extreme left, found no enemy in his front.
On November 29, these two brigades recrossed the river, and by a forced march, made by order of Lieutenant-General Longstreet, I moved with part of my force toward Tazewell to meet a supposed advance of the enemy from that direction.
Reaching the vicinity of Maynardville in the afternoon of the 30th, I found General Jones' division skirmishing with the enemy. It was too late to attack. General Armstrong, with his division, was sent around to the night to reach the rear of the enemy before daylight. The remainder of my force moved at daylight on Maynardville, but the enemy had rapidly retreated soon after daylight, leaving a small picket, which was captured, Being joined by General Armstrong, his division was pushed toward Clinch River, while General Jones' command was sent to the right to endeavor to effect a lodgment between the enemy and the river. A force of the enemy prevented his success. General Armstrong pushed the enemy in front, and finally he was driven across the river, after being pursued for some miles through difficult gorges, made more difficult by a frozen stream.
I returned to Knoxville in obedience to orders, reaching there December 2. The army on the second night afterward, the siege of Knoxville being raised, commenced its retreat toward Rogersville. General Morgan's division followed, covering the rear of General McLaws' division on the south side of the Holston. General Armstrong's division performed the same service on the Knoxville and river roads. The infantry and artillery having passed Bean's Station, I was ordered to move to the south side of the Holston and cover the railroad and left flank.
On December 10, a brigade of the enemy's cavalry attacked General Morgan's division at Russellville, while the greater portion of it was foraging. The enemy was handsomely repulsed by one-third of its number, leaving dead, wounded, and prisoners in our hands. In this affair the First and Sixth Georgia and Third Alabama Regiments were conspicuous for gallantry. Colonel Crews deserves mention for his skill and bravery on this occasion.
Lieutenant-General Longstreet having turned upon the enemy and attacked him at Bean's Station, I was ordered to cross the river and operate in his rear. While engaged in this movement, in order to cross the river it became necessary to dislodge the brigade of cavalry guarding May's Ford. This was done by a rapid fire of artillery from White's and Wiggins' batteries, of Morgan's division. The enemy lost 60 killed and wounded here.
Early next morning the enemy's pickets were driven in, and before I had entirely effected a crossing I was ordered to move upon the enemy's flank on the Knoxville road, 4 miles from Bean's Station. This was done immediately, and a high hill gained, from which my artillery could enfilade the enemy's breastworks. With great labor the guns were placed in position and rapidly and effectively served.
In the meantime, Morgan's division was dismounted and moved upon the enemy's flank. My guns were in sight of, and only 400 or 500 yards from, our infantry skirmishers, who it was expected would attack in front. My fire was continued for 1 1/2 hours, and the enemy began to retire, but was able to detach a large force to hold my men in check, as he was not pressed in front. With concert of action great damage could have been done the enemy on this day. Colonel Giltner, with his cavalry brigade, was on the side of Clinch Mountam, on the enemy's left flank, and prepared to second any movement of our infantry. As no movement was made, I held my position.
The next day I moved down the Knoxville and river roads in front of the enemy, who had retired in the night, and after several unimportant skirmishes we found him in a strong position, on Richland Creek, holding both roads with a force too great for my cavalry to cope with in a country not at all suited for cavalry operations.
On December 22, the command returned across the Holston and established a picket line from near New Market to Dandridge. Colonel Russell's brigade was posted 4 miles east of Dandridge. Colonel Crews' half way from Morristown to Dandridge. General Armstrong's division was concentrated at Talbott's Depot, on the road leading from Morristown to New Market. Commanders of divisions were instructed to attack the enemy in flank or rear if he made an attack upon any of these three positions.
On the morning of the 24th, simultaneous attacks were made upon General Armstrong and upon Colonel Russell. After spirited skirmishing the former, being flanked and outnumbered, was compelled to withdraw his pickets from near New Market to the eastern side of Mossy Creek. An unexpected attack upon Colonel Russell was made by 2,000 cavalry under Colonel Campbell. Russell's brigade was for a moment in confusion, but rallied and repulsed the enemy, who fell back 2 miles toward Dandridge.
In the meantime, four regiments of Crews' brigade (in all 600 men) moved in the rear of the enemy. Two of the regiments being in advance made a spirited charge on the enemy and captured his battery of artillery. Support being too far off, the brave men who made the charge were driven from the guns, and Major Bale, commanding Sixth Georgia, was left dead in the midst of the battery. Two pieces of artillery and the two remaining regiments of the brigade coming up, and the whole command being dismounted, the enemy was pushed from one position to another, until finally routed he abandoned one gun and caisson, his dead and wounded, and under cover of night escaped capture. Colonel Russell's brigade should have moved up, but the courier sent with orders failed to reach him. He was watching the movements of 500 of the enemy, who were moving on Crews' right, trying to escape.
I have never witnessed greater gallantry than was displayed by Colonel Crews and the officers and men of the First, Second, Third, and Sixth Georgia Cavalry.
The Fourth Georgia Cavalry was on detached service from this engagement at Kingston till December 30. The enemy, mounted, three times charged our dismounted men in open field and were as often repulsed, but not until, mingling in our ranks, some of his men were brought to the ground by clubbed guns. The enemy was pursued without effect by Colonel Russell in the night to New Market.
On the 27th, I made an effort to dislodge the enemy from Mossy Creek, but desisted, as couriers with orders to General Morgan did not find him, and he without orders moved his command, dismounted, from the position I had assigned to him, and made it thus impossible to effect my object.
On the 29th, I engaged the enemy at 9 a. m. with all my guns and 2,000 men. The fighting occurred on both sides of the railroad leading from Mossy Creek to Morristown, and commenced one-quarter of a mile west of Talbott's Station and ended near the same place at dark. General Morgan's division was dismounted and formed on the left of railroad, General Armstrong on the right. The country from this station to Mossy Creek is composed of open, rolling fields that had been tilled during the past year, flanked by high woodland on each side. I could not maneuver the artillery, except near the railroad.
Armstrong's division, with the artillery, was moved rapidly upon the enemy to engage his attention, while I hoped to flank him with Morgan's division on his right. His rapid retreat enabled him to avoid this, and both divisions finally were moved at double-quick and drove the enemy rapidly and in confusion back to Mossy Creek. Up to this time the force opposing us was not greater than 4,000 men, with two batteries.
Owing to the nature of the ground Crews' brigade had been thrown to the right of the railroad, and General Armstrong, with Crews' brigade, was ordered to move up his artillery to within canister range and to charge some woods in his front and that of Colonel Crews.
Colonel Russell's brigade had its right resting on the railroad and his left on the woods. Immediately in his front the enemy had occupied some barns and outhouses. I ordered him to dislodge him. The whole line moved forward. The enemy was driven from his position on our left, but by a charge of cavalry upon our right and of a brigade of infantry upon Crews' brigade and Armstrong's left, we were compelled to yield the ground.
The enemy fixed bayonets and moved into the open field to charge the Georgians and two howitzers some 200 yards in his front. Perceiving this I wheeled the Seventh Alabama Regiment to the right and moved it into a cut of the railroad, securing a good position within 50 yards of the flank of the advancing infantry. The fire from this regiment and a counter-charge by the Georgians soon drove the enemy into and through the woods, with heavy loss in killed and wounded. At this time the enemy made three cavalry charges upon Russell's left and produced some confusion for a moment. Assisted by the officers I was enabled to rally the men under a heavy fire from the cavalry and the enemy's artillery. For a short time all firing ceased, except from the artillery.
Upon reconnoitering the enemy's position preparatory to another attack, I found him strongly posted in my front and overlapping my line on both flanks with three brigades of cavalry, six regiments of infantry, and three batteries of artillery in position to sweep the open fields in my front. On the opposite side of the creek in full view, was a reserve of cavalry and infantry. A fresh brigade of cavalry was coming in from the Dandridge road in full view. My artillery had exhausted the supply of ammunition, except canister. The division commanders reported an average of only five rounds of ammunition for small-arms. The Third Arkansas, a gallant little regiment, had fired the last round in its cartridge boxes, and had been ordered to the rear. The men had been fighting steadily without relief for seven hours. To advance was impossible, and to mount and retire on the open fields in daylight before so large a force with such a preponderance of mounted men would, I knew, be difficult. It could only be accomplished by the utmost steadiness. The retreat, under a heavy fire of artillery and small-arms, was effected in perfect order, the regiments falling back in succession to advantageous points, and then fighting until, having checked the enemy sufficiently, they could gain another point of vantage.
While officers and men deserve great credit for their gallantry in the advance, their conduct during this difficult and hazardous movement to the rear entitles them to the highest praise. The enemy's bugles often sounded the charge. At first the charge was made, but not a second one. At dusk, after nine hours of severe fighting and marching, the command was halted and formed, and the enemy finally repulsed. There was not then an average of 1 round of ammunition to the man.
No action had taken place since the 29th; only slight skirmishes have occurred.
I would mention Brigadier-Generals Armstrong and Morgan, and Colonels Crews and Harrison, commanding brigades, and Colonel Thompson, Third Georgia, and Colonel Malone for gallantry on the 29th.
Captain Huggins, Lieutenants Pue and Blake, all of the artillery, deserve special mention. It is difficult, however, to distinguish.The officers and men vied with each other in the discharge of their duties.
I cannot omit to mention a most gallant charge made by the Eighth Texas Regiment (the Rangers).
I would call attention to remarks of the division and brigade commanders upon the destitute condition of their men. Their representations are not colored. A very large proportion of my men, and even officers, are ragged and barefooted, without blankets or overcoats. Owing to the want of attention to the duties of his office, the quartermaster of General Wheeler's corps left my command in great need of clothing. We have drawn none for fall or winter. A very large number of my horses are unshod. The men have received no pay for six months. The extremely cold weather has made it almost impossible for me to move. I refer to the reports* of Generals Armstrong and Morgan and Colonels Harrison, Biffle, and Crews for further particulars.
A tabular statement* of casualties is hereto appended.
The activity of the cavalry and multiplicity of its marches since I took command of it will furnish an excuse for the length of this report.
Respectfully submitted.
WILLINOIS T. MARTIN
Sept 10, 1863 - Pea Vine Creek, Ga.
Report of Captain David J. Jones, First Kentucky Infantry.
OOLTEWAH, TENN., April 20, 1864
SIR: In accordance with your request, I have the honor to make the following report of the circumstances connected with the capture of myself and 22 of my company, near Pea Vine Creek, Ga., on the 10th of September, 1863.
In the advance from Chattanooga, four companies of my regiment under Major Hadlock, constituted the advance guard, disposed as follows: Company K, under Lieutenant Hornung, deployed across the road and on either side as skirmishers; Company B, under Lieutenant Hammond, marching by the flank in the road as a reserve for the line of skirmishers; and the remaining two (D and G) also marching by the flank some distance in rear. During the morning a body of mounted men were sent to the extreme front. These came across the enemy near Pea Vine Creek, and commenced skirmishing with them. The advance was halted, and our column moved up to its support. It being apparent that the enemy were in considerable force in our front, and that they intended an offensive movement, dispositions were at once made to meet the contemplated attack. Three companies of the battalion were formed in line across the road, Company B in the woods to the right; my company (D), with the colors and color-guard on its right, and about seven files of Company G on its left, occupied the road; the remainder of Company G in the woods to the left. The line, thus formed, was advantageously posted behind the crest of a hillock in the road, and commanded the road as far as the fork, perhaps 600 yards. Company K was still in front deployed as skirmishers. We remained half an hour or so, slight skirmishing going on between our cavalry and the enemy, until the former withdrew and went to the rear, leaving our skirmishers directly opposed to the enemy. Soon the dust to our front and right plainly indicated an advance of the enemy, and, unaccountably, Company K fell back upon our main body, and resisted the utmost endeavors of their commander to drive them to their duty. Seeing that there was no probability of the skirmishers being advanced to cover our front, I suggested that they establish a new line where we then stood, and the main body be withdrawn about 100 yards to the rear. Major Hadlock acted upon my suggestion so far as to move the main line about 50 yards to the rear, in such a position that we could see the road no farther than the crest of the hillock before mentioned a distance of not more than 60 yards at farthest. A cloud of dust in front told plainly the enemy were coming, and not far off. The line of skirmishers fell back on their appearance; the main line, with pieces ready, awaiting orders with a coolness and determination I never saw surpassed. As the enemy came up we could hear the clatter of the horses' hoofs (they were cavalry), but could not see them on account of the elevation in front. At this time Major Hadlock was on a slight elevation in our rear, and, being mounted, could see the enemy as they approached much sooner than any of his command could. While we were still waiting, no enemy yet in sight, we were surprised by an order from Major Hadlock to fire, accompanied with some such remark as that we will give them one volley anyhow. There can be no mistaking that there was no enemy in sight when my company fired in obedience to the order thus given. Though the men aimed very low, the volley, of course, proved ineffectual, as it passed over their heads. We were thus with empty pieces when a moment after the head of the enemy's column appeared on the crest in front, and halted to observe the position of things. On their appearance Major Hadlock ordered a retreat in quick time, the men reloading as they fell back. The enemy, quick to profit by the advantage thus given them, charged us. Seeing the new danger, the major ordered a double-quick, and being thus thrown into confusion, we fell an easy prey. My company, being altogether in the road with no advantages for escape, suffered a greater loss than the rest, while the companies in the woods suffered slightly. None of the men captured were wounded, and but 2 of the enemy were struck, both hurt slightly. These and the 2 horses wounded were shot by the file leaders and such others of my company who did not fire with the body of the company. After my capture I learned that one regiment of cavalry, the Sixth Georgia, under Colonel Hart, was the attacking force, but that one company of the regiment, Company A, under Captain Brown, made the charge and routed our four companies. I would be doing a gross injustice to the men with whom I have shared the fortunes of war for the last three years did I close this report without bearing testimony that throughout this most disgraceful affair the alacrity with which they obeyed orders, and the coolness they evinced, I never saw surpassed, and that, though sharing the discharge, and, many of them, with myself, the suffering consequent, they do not deserve any part of the blame.
Sept 12,1863 - Statement of Captain Lewis L. Carter, Company B, Ninth Tennessee, U. S. Army
I was captured near Ringgold in a skirmish with the Sixth Georgia Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Hart on the 12th of September; was then taken to Bragg's headquarters. I was there questioned by Colonel McKinstry, of General Bragg's staff, as to the strength of the Federal army. Upon refusing to answer any questions of that kind, General Bragg, who was lying in the tent at the time, called me a black scoundrel.
Sept 24,1863 - Report of Brigadier General John Pegram, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Near Chickamauga Station, September 24, 1863.
MAJOR: In obedience to orders, I have the honor to make the following report of the recent combats of my command with the enemy:
The first of these occurred near Graysville on the 10th instant, when, being out on a reconnaissance with the Sixth Georgia Cavalry (Colonel Hart), it was reported the enemy had thrown himself between Colonel Scott and myself. Deeming the opening of the communication with Scott most important, I ordered Colonel Hart to charge the enemy with two companies of his regiment. This he most gallantly did, and brought out 59 prisoners (being the skirmishers of Palmer's division) from within sight of the masses of the enemy.
The second engagement with the enemy was on the 12th instant, near Leet's Tan-yard, where we fought for two hours Wilder's Lightning Brigade of mounted infantry. My force engaged in this fight was the Sixth Georgia and Rucker's Legion. It would be impossible to pay too high a tribute to the daring gallantry of my small force in this unequal conflict with the picked brigade of General Crittenden's corps. For a time the fight was almost literally hand to hand. I was forced back only about 400 yards, which point I held during the night.
My loss in this fight was about 50 killed and wounded, numbering some of my most valuable young officers. A correct list of killed and wounded will be forwarded.
Our next meeting with the foe was on Saturday, the 19th instant, on the memorable field of the Chickamauga. Brigadier-General Davidson, having reported for duty, was assigned to the command of my old brigade. He was ordered to take position near Reed's Saw-Mill. Before reaching it he met and drove before him the enemy's pickets, capturing some few of them. Soon after this skirmish, while General Forrest and I were in front examining the road, General Davidson was attacked suddenly upon his left. Hurrying back, I found it somewhat difficult, aided by General Davidson and all my staff officers, to get the command in a proper position to repel the fierce attacks of the enemy's infantry. All the available force was, however, soon well posted under the general direction of General Forrest. It became at once apparent to all that we were fighting overpowering numbers. General Forrest having sent several messengers for the infantry to come up, finally went for them himself, ordering me to hold the position until their arrival. In obeying this order our loss was about one-fourth of the command, including several officers. Nearly every colonel of the brigade had a horse shot under him.
Although the highest praise is due to all the gallant men engaged in this (for cavalry) remarkable fight, I must not omit mentioning particularly Colonel Goode, of the Tenth Confederate Cavalry, whose horse was shot, and Captain Arnold, commanding Sixteenth Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, who was badly wounded.
Our next engagement with the enemy was with Colonel Minty's brigade of mounted infantry, being a part of the rear guard of General Rosecrans' army. After driving his skirmishers for a mile, we found him strongly posted on Mississippi Ridge. We drove him from one fine position, but were unable to dislodge him from the summit from which, however, he retired during the night. In holding the ground gained, my command was subjected to a heavy fire of canister at 300 yards range.
Both General Davidson and Colonel Scott lost several men, among whom, I regret to say, was the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Fain, of the Sixth Georgia [Cavalry], badly wounded. The steadfastness with which both brigades bore this artillery fire was admirable in the extreme, especially as evincing the discipline of the men.
General Davidson again met the enemy on the 22nd, on the Chattanooga and Hiwassee road. With a part of his brigade he attacked and routed the Fifty-ninth Ohio Infantry, took a number of prisoners, arms, &c., and was prevented from capturing the regiment entire only by a mistake of one of his own regiments, which fired upon the portion headed by himself.
It will be observed my report is confined to the operations of the brigade lately commanded by myself. This is because the other brigades of the division have, in the exigencies of the service been separated from me.
For Colonel Scott's operations, I refer you to his report, herewith inclosed.
I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN PEGRAM,
Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry Division
November 1863 - THE KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE, CAMPAIGN
November 19, 1863 -
SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,
No. 98. Near Knoxville, November 19, 1863
I. Colonel H. B. Lyon, C. S. Army, will proceed to Kingston, Tennessee, and take command of the cavalry at that point, reporting at least four times a day to General Longstreet.
II. Should the enemy attempt to make a crossing at that point he will resist them stubbornly, and keep General Longstreet well advised of their movements.
III. Colonel Lyon will establish a line of couriers between Kingston and General Longstreet's headquarters.
IV. Colonel Hart, Sixth Georgia Cavalry, will report for duty with his command to Brigadier-General Martin.
V. Captain George Turner will proceed to the headquarters of Brigadier-General Wright, at Charleston, Tennessee, and learn more particularly regarding the depredations said to have been committed by the cavalry in that vicinity, to which General Wright in his letter of the 10th instant [November, 1863] [refers].
IX. Brig. Gen. W. Y. C. Humes will proceed to Dalton, Ga., and report to Brig. General H. B. Davidson for assignment to the cavalry brigade composed of the following named regiments: First [Sixth] Tennessee Regiment, Colonel J. T. Wheeler; First Tennessee Regiment, Colonel Carter; Second Tennessee Regiment, Fourth Tennessee Regiment, Colonel Baxter Smith; Fifth Tennessee Regiment.
By order of Major-General Wheeler:
E. S. BURFORD
November 20, 1863 - HEADQUARTERS, November 20, 1863-9 p.m.
Maj. Gen. JOSEPH WHEELER,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL:
The lieutenant-general commanding desires that you will send him as early as you can to-morrow morning Hart's or any other good brigade of cavalry. He wishes to send it across the river below this point.
I am, general, your obedient servant,
G. M. SORREL,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General
Report of Lieutenant-General James Longstreet, Commanding,
HEADQUARTERS,
Russellville, East Tennessee, January 1, 1864.
GENERAL: About November 1, a camp rumor reached me to the effect that I was to be ordered into East Tennessee, to operate against the enemy's forces at and near Knoxville. Such a move had not occurred to me previously as practicable. I therefore set to work to fix upon some plan by which it might be executed. After two days' reflection I concluded the move might be made with safety by withdrawing our army behind the Chickamauga to some strong position, at the same time withdrawing our forces then at Sweetwater, so as to give out the impression that we were concentrating behind the Chickamauga, but at the same time to make a rapid movement by the most the enemy so suddenly and so severely that his force should be crushed before he could know anything of our purposes; then to retire to meet the enemy at Chattanooga, or, better, to operate rapidly against his rear and flank. The reason for retiring behind the Chickamauga with our main force was, that our extended line being so near the enemy would enable him to concentrate and march against any point of it in twenty minutes after leaving his works.
The day after arriving at this conclusion (November 3) I was called to council by the commanding general, with Lieutenant-General Hardee and Major-General Breckinridge. The subject of the movements of our army being called, campaigns were proposed and discussed, and pronounced by those familiar with the country as impracticable, owing to the scarcity of supplies in the country. The campaign in East Tennessee was then discussed, and I proposed the plan that I have already mentioned.
A campaign was settled upon. Two divisions (McLaws' and Hood's), under my command, were spoken of as the force from Chattanooga to execute it. I repeated my apprehensions about our lines thus weakened remaining so near the enemy's works, but failed to make any impression upon the minds of the other officers, and endeavored to explain that the force that I would have would be too weak to operate with that promptness which the occasion seemed to require. At the end of the consultation I was ordered verbally to begin my preparations for the campaign.
After reaching my headquarters I gave orders for the withdrawal of Alexander's battalion of artillery at once, and ordered General McLaws to withdraw his division after night; these commands to march the following day to Tyner's Station, to take the cars for Sweet Water. Leyden's artillery was withdrawn the next day, and Hood's division the following night. Leyden's artillery and Hood's division were ordered to meet the cars at the tunnel through Missionary Ridge. I applied at general headquarters for maps and information about the country that I was to operate in, also for a quartermaster and commissary of subsistence who knew the resources of the country,
and an engineer officer who had been serving on Major-General Buckner's staff at Knoxville. None of the staff officers asked for were sent me,nor were any of the maps, except one of the country between the Hiwassee and Tennessee Rivers. Major-General Buckner was kind enough to give me some inaccurate maps of the country along the Holston-all that he had. The best one a map of roads and rivers only.
There was much delay in getting the troops up to Sweet Water by rail. As I had no control over this transportation I could apply no remedy further than to make details from my command to assist wherever aid was needed. Letters from the commanding general's headquarters seemed to urge upon me the importance of prompt movements in a spirit which appeared to intimate that the delays which had occurred were due to some neglect of mine, or some want of appreciation on my part, of the importance of prompt and energetic action. As I had urged from the moment the campaign was proposed the importance of such action, I thought that I ought not to have been urged on in such a tone, particularly as all of the delays that had occurred were upon the railroad over which I had no control. Hence my letter of the 11th, in answer to Lieutenant Ellis' of the 9th. I mentioned this not as an excuse for the letter, but in palliation of it. Major-General Stevenson, who had been in command of our forces at Sweet Water, told me with entire confidence in his information that the enemy's forces were 23,000. This information he had also sent to General Bragg. This I now believe to be a correct statement of the enemy's force under General Burnside upon his entrance into East Tennessee. He also informed me that he had not been advised of my move, and so far from being ordered to have rations or supplies for us, he was ordered to send everything of the kind to the army of Chattanooga. As my orders were to drive the enemy out of East Tennessee, or, if possible, capture him, I determined that the only possible chance of succeeding in either or both was to move and act as though I had a sufficient force to do either. I endeavored, therefore, to do as I should have done had the 20,000 men that I asked for been given me. Had the means been at hand for making the proper moves I should have marched for the rear of Knoxville via Morganton and Maryville, and gained possession of the heights there by forced marches. My transportation was so limited, however, that I could not spare a wagon to haul the pontoons for our bridge. The only move that I could make under the circumstances was by crossing the river where the cars delivered the bridge-Loudon. On the night of November 13, Major-General Wheeler was detached with three of his brigades of cavalry, with orders to surprise a cavalry force of the enemy at Maryville (reported to be a brigade), capture it, and move on to the rear of Knoxville and endeavor to get possession of some of the heights on the south side, and to hold them until our arrival, or failing in this, to threaten the enemy at Knoxville, so as to prevent his concentrating his forces against us before we reached Knoxville. He surprised the force at Maryville (only about 400 strong), captured a part, and dispersed the balance of it. He moved on to Knoxville and failed to get possession of any of the heights which commanded the town, but created the diversion in my favor.
His other brigade, under Colonel Hart, was sent down to Kingston
As soon as we crossed the river, with orders to break up any force that the enemy might have there, and to leave a regiment there on picket. The balance of the brigades was ordered to return to our column and advance to Campbell's station, in front of General McLaws' division. After making the diversion at Knoxville, General Wheeler was ordered to retire and rejoin us by crossing the Holston on our right flank. Colonel Alexander, chief of artillery, and Major Clarke, chief engineer, were sent to select a point where we could make a crossing in front of the enemy, that being the only place to which we could transport the bridge. Fortunately a very good point was found near Loudon at Huff's Ferry the day before the troops got up. Most of the troops being up on the 12th, the order to advance on the 13th at daylight was issued. The troops then in rear came up during the night of the 12th, and these moved forward to join us as soon as they could cook their rations. The head of the column was halted near Loudon beyond the enemy's view during the day, and the cars with the pontoons were stopped out of sight till after night. A select detail was made to throw across the river in advance, and details were made to roll the cars up to the nearest point of the river as soon as dark came on. At dark the cars were pushed up and the boats were taken down to the river as quietly as possible, with the hope that we might surprise and capture the enemy's pickets on the opposite bank. The information that we got from our cavalry pickets not being accurate, we failed in the effort. The picket escaped and gave the alarm, but the enemy did not attempt to molest us. The night of the 13th and 14th was occupied in laying the bridge and in crossing. In the afternoon of the 14th a considerable infantry force advanced and skirmished with us for some time, driving in our line of sharpshooters and deploying along our front as if to give battle. Upon moving out on the morning of the 15th the enemy was found to be retiring. The sharpshooters of Hood's division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Logan, after a brisk skirmish drove in the enemy's rear in some confusion, he taking up his line of retreat along the road which follows the railroad. Not having a map of the topography of the country, I was of necessity dependent upon such information as I could get from the guides and from my own observation. I found that the enemy in retiring to his line of retreat had crossed a considerable ridge, which runs parallel with the railroad,and is impassable to vehicles except at certain gaps. Putting a small force at the pass over which the enemy retired, I advanced along the west side of the ridge on a road running parallel with the ridge and to the road by which the enemy must retire. Arriving opposite Lenoir's Station I found a picket guard of the enemy at a gap in the ridge. After a little examination I found the enemy at Lenoir's in considerable force and taken completely by surprise, thinking that our force immediately in his rear was the only force that was advancing. With confident hope of reaping the full benefit of this surprise I moved down upon him. The ground was so muddy and the hills so high (almost mountains) that we were not able to get one division up and in position till after night. Some of the troops were sent under guides after night to get possession of the roads in the enemy's rear, and about midnight General Jenkins advanced his brigade and got possession of the only ground that the enemy could expect to occupy to give battle. When daylight came it was found that the guides had failed to put the troops upon the right road, and that the enemy had during the night abandoned part of his wagon train and made a hurried retreat. Hood's division was put in pursuit, and McLaws' division, being on the road to Campbell's Station, was ordered to move forward as rapidly as possible and endeavor to intercept the enemy (in full retreat) at Campbell's Station. Jenkins' sharpshooters pursued rapidly,skirmishing nearly all of the time and making every effort to force the enemy to make a stand, but did not succeed in doing so until after he had passed Campbell's Station. He escaped General McLaws also and took a strong position east of Campbell's Station. As soon as General McLaws got up he was ordered to deploy three of his brigades in front of the enemy, and to put his other brigade upon a ridge on our left, so as to threaten the enemy's right. At the same time Colonel Alexander put his artillery in position, and General Jenkins was ordered with Hood's division around the enemy's left, and upon arriving opposite the enemy's position to make an attack upon that flank, while General McLaws was advancing against the enemy's front to follow Jenkins' attack. The flank movement and fire of our batteries caused the enemy to retreat in some haste. McLaws' division advanced promptly and brought the enemy to a stand about a mile farther toward his rear in a more commanding position. If General Jenkins could have made his attack during this movement, or if he could have made it after the enemy had taken his second position, we must have destroyed this force, recovered East Tennessee, and in all probability captured the greater portion of the enemy's forces. He attributes his failure to do so to some mismanagement of General Law. Before I could get a staff officer to him to ascertain the occasion of the delay night came on and our efforts ceased. The enemy drew off as soon as it was dark and retired to Knoxville. We advanced again at daylight, but only came up with the enemy's rear guard of cavalry. There was more or less skirmishing with this force until our line of skirmishers and our advanced battery came under the fire from the enemy's fort at the northwest angle of his lines at Knoxville. His line of skirmishers was about 1,000 yards in front of his works. General McLaws' skirmishers engaging them, Hart's brigade of cavalry was ordered over to the Clinton road to drive in the skirmishers of the enemy, and as soon as Hood's division came up it was ordered over to that road, and Hart's cavalry was sent on to the Tazewell road, so as to prevent as far as possible the escape of the enemy. I rode over to the Clinton road to make an examination of the country and select some position for Hood's division before night. The next day, on riding to General McLaws' front, I found that the enemy's pickets occupied the same ground that they held the day before, and that his line had been strengthened during the night by making a defense of rails. Colonel Alexander was ordered to use his guns against this defense, and succeeded once or twice in driving the enemy off from some points of it; but our skirmishers did not move up to occupy it, and the enemy returned to it. I finally ordered General McLaws to order his troops up to take the position. Part of the troops moved up handsomely and got partial possession; others faltered and sought shelter under a rise of the ground, when Captain Winthrop, of Colonel Alexander's staff, appreciating the danger of delay at such a moment, mounted his horse and dashing up to the front of our line led the troops over the work. He had the misfortune to receive a severe wound in this affair.
Our force was not strong enough to risk an assault from so great a distance from the enemy's works. He had as many as we in a strong position fortified. We went to work, therefore, to make our way forward by gradual and less hazardous measures, at the same time making examinations of the enemy's entire positions. General Wheeler retired from Knoxville and crossed the Holston near Louisville and joined us on the 18th. His three brigades were stationed on the Tazewell road, and Hart's brigade was sent back to Kingston, where a brigade of the enemy's cavalry was reported to be. Our transportation being limited we had brought no tools for intrenching or other work, except those that our small pioneer parties had. We were so fortunate, however, as to capture a large number of picks and spades in the abandoned wagons of the enemy at Lenoir's Station; also a pontoon bridge in the river near that place. We had the tools brought up by our cavalry upon their horses, and set to work to strengthen our position and make advances by throwing our picket lines forward at night. The enemy's line along General Jenkins' front seemed very weak and his entire line very long. Upon an examination of his line on the 20th, on the Clinton road, General Jenkins thought that he might push in his skirmishers and find the means of breaking the enemy's line. He was ordered to advance his skirmishers a little before night, and to have his command ready, and if the opportunity proved favorable to throw his entire force upon the enemy and break his line. A little after dark he reported the matter impracticable. Our line was then about 700 yards from the enemy's. After careful examination I became convinced that the true key to the enemy's position was by the heights on the south side of the Holston, and crossed a small force (Laws' and Robertson's brigades) in flat-boats and obtained possession of one of the heights near and opposite the lower end of the enemy's line. This position gave us command of the fort and line in front of General McLaws, but the range from the hill to the fort was too great for our limited supply of ammunition. With a view to operations on a more extensive scale on the south side, the pontoon bridge that we had captured was ordered up. Our first effort was to get it up by the river, but that was reported impracticable, as there were rapids that the boats could not be hauled over. We were, therefore, obliged to send wagons to haul the bridge.
On the 22nd, General McLaws seemed to think his line near enough for an assault, and he was ordered to make it at dark on that night. General Jenkins was ordered to be prepared to co-operate. After night General McLaws reported against the assault, saying that this officers would prefer to attack by daylight.
On the 23rd instant [?], Major-General Wheeler, in conformity with instructions, moved upon Kingston with three brigades of cavalry.
A portion of the next day was passed in skirmishing with the enemy at that place, General Wheeler finally desisting and withdrawing a short distance on account of the strong position occupied by the enemy, and the superior numbers which he reports him to have had. Colonel Hart, who was left at Kingston with a brigade of cavalry, reported that the enemy's force in front of General Wheeler there consisted of but three regiments of cavalry and a battery of artillery.
On the 24th, General Wheeler received orders from General Bragg to rejoin him in person, and in accordance with those orders the command of the cavalry was turned over to Major-General Martin. The official report of General Wheeler will explain fully his operations before Kingston. The cavalry, with the exception of one brigade, returned from Kingston on the 26th, and resumed its operations about Knoxville.
On the 23d, I received a telegram from the commanding general informing me that the enemy had moved out and attacked him at Chattanooga. Later on the same day I received another dispatch announcing that the enemy was still in front of him, but the firing had ceased. On the night of the same day his letter of the 22nd was received.
On the 25th, I received a telegram from Brig. General B. R. Johnson, at Loudon, informing me that the enemy's cavalry was advancing upon Charleston. As I had received nothing from the commanding general on the 24th, I concluded that the enemy had moved out on the 23rd for the purpose of threatening him, while he passed his cavalry out for the purpose of making a raid on Charleston and thus cut off the re-enforcements then on their way to me. On the night of the 25th, General Leadbetter joined me. We made a hasty reconnaissance of the enemy's entire position on the 26th. From the heights on the south side he pronounced the enemy's fort in front of General McLaws assailable. After riding around the enemy's lines, however, he expressed his preference for an attack against Mabry's Hill, at the northeast of the position. On the 27th, a more careful examination of Mabry's Hill was made by Generals Leadbetter, Jenkins, Colonel Alexander, and myself. The opinion of all on this day was that the ground over which the troops would have to pass was too much exposed and the distance to be overcome under fire was too great. General Leadbetter was urgent that something should be done quickly, but admitted that the way to the enemy's position was by the heights on the south side.
On the 27th, Colonel Giltner's brigade of cavalry, of Major-General Ransom's command, arrived near Knoxville for co-operation with me, and on the 28th Brig. General W. E. Jones reported with his brigade of cavalry of the same command. On the 26th and 27th, we had various rumors of a battle having been fought at Chattanooga, the most authentic being from telegraph operators. There seemed to be so many reports leading to the same conclusion that I determined that I must attack, and, if possible, get possession of Knoxville. The attack upon the fort was ordered for the 28th, but in order to get our troops nearer the works the assault was postponed until daylight of the 29th. The line of sharpshooters along our entire front was ordered to be advanced at dark to within good rifle-range of the enemy's lines, and to sink rifle-pits during the night in its advanced position, so that the sharpshooters along our whole line might engage the enemy upon an equal footing, while our columns made the assault upon the fort. Our advance at night was very successful, capturing 60 or 70 prisoners without any loss. The assault was ordered to be made by three of General McLaws' brigades, his fourth being held in readiness for further operations. General Jenkins was ordered to advance a brigade a little later than the assaulting columns and to pass the enemy's lines east of the fort, and to continue the attack along the enemy's rear and flank. Two brigades of Major-General Buckner's division, under Brig. General B. R. Johnson, having arrived the day before, were ordered to move in rear of General McLaws, and at a convenient distance, to be thrown in as circumstances might require. On the night of the 28th, General McLaws' letter of that date was received. General McLaws' letter was shown to General Leadbetter, and my answer was read to him. General Leadbetter then suggested the postscript which I added to the answer. The assault was made at the appointed time by Generals Wofford's, Humphreys', and Bryan's brigades. The troops were not formed as well to the front as they should have been. Their lines should have been formed close up on our line of rifle-pits, which would have given them but about 200 yards to advance under fire. Instead of this lines were formed several hundred yards in rear of the pits. My orders were that the advance should be made quietly until they entered the works, which was to be announced by a shout. The troops moved up in gallant style and formed handsomely at the outside of the ditch. As I approached the troops seemed to be in good order at the edge of the ditch,and some of the colors appeared to be on the works. When within about 500 yards of the fort I saw some of the men straggling back, and heard that the troops could not pass the ditch for want of ladders or other means. Almost at the same moment I saw that the men were beginning to retire in considerable numbers, and very soon the column broke up entirely and fell back in confusion. I ordered Buckner's brigade halted and retired,a nd sent the order for Anderson's brigade, of Hood's division, to be halted and retired, but the troops of the latter brigade had become excited and rushed up to the same point from which the others had been repulsed, and were soon driven back. Officers were set to work to rally the men, and good order was soon restored. About half an hour after the repulse Major Branch, of Major-General Ransom's staff, arrived with a telegram from the President through General Ransom, informing me that General Bragg had retired before superior numbers, and directing that I should proceed to co-operate with him. Orders were issued at once for our trains to move back to Loudon in order that we might follow as soon as possible to rejoin General Bragg. On the afternoon of the same day I received a note from General Wheeler, by General Bragg's authority, directing that I should rejoin him at Ringgold, if practicable. Reports began to come in at the same time that the enemy were in force at Cleveland. As the note of General Wheeler seemed to indicate that it was doubtful whether I could effect a junction with General Bragg, I ordered my trains to return to me at Knoxville. It appeared to me that the best thing for us was to hold the enemy at Knoxville until the army at Chattanooga should be obliged to make heavy detachments to succor the garrison at Knoxville, and that in that way we would be able to relieve General Bragg's army,and give him time to rally and to receive re-enforcements. The principal officers of the command were called to advise, and the general opinion expressed was, that it would be imprudent to attempt to rejoin General Bragg with the lights then before us. About this time two messengers came from must depend on "my own resources." Upon this I determined to remain at Knoxville until seriously threatened by a succoring army from Chattanooga, and wrote to General Ransom, then at Rogersville, to move down and join me and aid me in reducing the enemy, or to aid me in the event that a small succoring force should attempt to relieve Knoxville.
On December 1, Colonel Giltner, commanding one of General Ransom's brigades of cavalry, reported to me that he had received orders from General Ransom that he (Colonel Giltner), with his brigade, should rejoin General Ransom. On the same day a courier from General Grant was captured,bearing an autograph letter to General Burnside with the information that three columns were advancing to his relief-one by the south side, under General Sherman; one by Decherd, under General Elliott, and one by Cumberland Gap, under General Foster. The enemy were then reported as pressing our forces below Loudon with superior numbers. General Vaughn, in command at Loudon, had been ordered to move all stores that he could haul to the north side of the river, and to be prepared, in case the enemy marched against him with superior forces, to destroy such property as he could not remove, and to cross the river with his troops and join me at Knoxville. General Leadbetter, who was at Loudon before this, had been requested by me to order General Vaughn to rejoin General Bragg's army by passing through the mountains, if he though it practicable. Major-General Wheeler wrote about the same time for the cavalry of General Bragg's army serving with me to be returned to that army. As I was cut off from all communication and entirely dependent upon the surrounding country for supplies, and threatened from all sides, I did not think it prudent to dispense with the cavalry and declined to send it. As General Vaughn was not sent to General Bragg, as suggested, and was seriously threatened by the enemy in his rear (the enemy's force at Kingston also being reported as increasing), he was ordered to destroy everything that he could not remove that would be of value to the enemy, and to proceed to join me at Knoxville. As our position at Knoxville was somewhat complicated, I determined to abandon the siege and to draw off in the direction of Virginia, with an idea that we might find an opportunity to strike that column of the enemy's forces reported to be advancing by Cumberland Gap. The orders to move, in accordance with this view, were issued on December 2. Our trains were put in motion on the 3rd to cross the Holston at Strawberry Plains, escorted by Generals Law's and Robertson's brigades, of Hood's division, and one of Alexander's batteries. On the night of the 4th, the troops were withdrawn from the west side of Knoxville and marched around to the east side, when they took up a line of march along the north bank of the Holston River. General Martin,with his own and General Ransom's cavalry, was left at Knoxville to cover the movement. As our march was not interrupted by the enemy, we were enabled to reach Blain's Cross-Roads on the afternoon of the 5th, where we met General Ransom with the infantry and artillery of his command. On the 6th, we marched to Rutledge, where we remained until the 8th.
As there was no indication of a force moving from Cumberland Gap, I did not feel that I should keep General Bragg's cavalry any longer' and as the enemy's cavalry had moved out, and seemed disposed to annoy us-I could not remain so near him and depend upon our small cavalry force to protect our foraging trains-I concluded to retire to Rogersville and to order General Bragg's cavalry back to Georgia. We accordingly marched for Rogersville on the 8th, ordering all of our cavalry except Giltner's brigade across the Holston, near Bean's Station. Martin's cavalry, belonging to General Bragg's army, was ordered to return to that army through the mountains of North Carolina and Georgia, and Jones' brigade, of General Ransom's command, to cover the movements of our troops and trains on the south side of the Holston. The column reached Rogersville on the 9th. The accounts that we got of the resources of the country were favorable, and we halted and put our trains out getting provisions, &c. As there were not enough mills to grind more than flour to feed the command from day to day, we were obliged to reduce the bread ration one-half in order to accumulate a few day's rations. On the 10th, I received a telegram from the President which seemed to give me discretionary power with regard to the troops and their movement. The order for General Martin's cavalry to return to General Bragg was countermanded at once, and it was held in position between our main force and the enemy. On the 12th, I received information that I thought reliable that a part of the enemy's re-enforcements from Chattanooga had returned to that place, and that the enemy had a forage consisting of three brigades of cavalry and one of infantry at Bean's Station, his main force being between Rutledge and Blain's Cross-Roads. Orders were issued for the troops to be in readiness to march on the 14th, with the hope of being able to surprise and capture the enemy's force at Bean's Station, our main force to move directly down from Rogersville to Bean's Station. General Martin,with four brigades of cavalry, was to move down on the south side and across the Holston opposite Bean's Station, or below, and General W. E. Jones, with two brigades of cavalry, was to pass down on the north side of Clinch Mountain and prevent the enemy's escape by Bean's Station Gap. On the 13th, and that night we had heavy rains, which retarded our march and made a slight rise in the Holston. The infantry column, however, reached Bean's Station in good time and surprised the enemy completely. General W. E. Jones also got his position in good time and captured a number of the enemy's wagons. His information with regard to our movements, however, was not correct, and he retired from the gap after securing his captured wagons. General Martin was not heard at his crossing till about night. He then only crossed a part of his command, and afterward withdrew it. As our column was composed of infantry and artillery only, we could only drive the enemy back. Brig. General B. R. Johnson, commanding Buckner's division, advanced directly against the enemy and drove him steadily to the buildings at Bean's Station, where he met with a strong resistance. General Kershaw, at the head of General McLaws' division, was ordered in upon the right of Johnson to push forward and cut off the force that was occupying the gap, and then to pass down upon the left flank of the force in the valley. General Kershaw executed his orders literally and most promptly; but we could not catch the enemy's cavalry. The night was dark and General Kershaw halted after he had executed his orders. Our cavalry was not up, and the enemy escaped to a strong position 3 miles from us. During the night he strengthened his position by rail defenses and some re-enforcements. He was found in this position in the morning.
Upon ordering Major-General McLaws to send a part of his command up in the gap on the morning of the 15th to capture the force that had been cut off there, he informed me that his troops had had no bread rations for two days. I directed him to send a brigade up, and to hurry his rations up and have them issued and cooked at once.
General Jenskins, commanding Hood's division, was ordered to pursue at daylight,which he did, and found the enemy in the position above mentioned, 3 miles below Bean's Station. Upon a casual examination the force appeared to be the cavalry that we had engaged the day before. I directed General Jenkins to examine the force and position, and to attack if he found an opportunity. I rode back to secure the force in the gap, reported by the citizens at the station to be stronger than I had supposed. Humphreys' brigade had been ordered into the gap, and upon reaching it he found that the enemy had abandoned everything except his arms, and escaped during the night by passing along the top of mountain.Brigadier-General Law, with his own and Brigadier-General Robertson's brigade,had been on detached service guarding our trains,and was some 8 miles behind his division on the night of the 14th. He had been ordered to join it on the 13th, but did not succeed in doing so.
On the night of the 14th, he was ordered to march early on the following day and join the division as soon as he possibly could. He reported to General Jenkins, the division commander,between 3 and 4 have done (6 o'clock) he must have been about 11 hour marching as many miles. General Jenkins reports that the enemy re-enforced with infantry before General Law joined him.
A little before sunset General Jenkins reported that he thought the enemy was preparing to advance against him. I ordered General McLaws to send him one of his brigades to re-enforce him. General McLaws sent me in reply that his men had not yet had any bread rations. He, however, sent the brigade ordered up. The enemy's move, which created the impression of his advance, was probably caused by the appearance of General Martin's cavalry on his flank. A little after night the enemy retreated and our skirmishers occupied their defenses. The pursuit was ordered by daylight by Hood's division of infantry and Martin's cavalry. As I rode to the front General Law preferred a complaint of hardships, &c. General McLaws was not yet fed, and there seemed so strong a desire for rest rather than to destroy the enemy, that I was obliged to abandon the pursuit, although the enemy were greatly demoralized and in some confusion. This was the second time during the campaign when the enemy was completely in our power, and we allowed him to escape us. General Martin was ordered to pursue with his cavalry. General Armstrong, who followed immediately behind the enemy, reported his retreat so rapid that he could not bring him to a stand until he reached Blain's Cross-Roads. There he made a successful stand against our cavalry. After exhausting the supply of forage between Blain's Cross-Roads and Rogersville, the command was moved to its present position on the south side of the Holston and ordered to make shelters for the winter.
As we did not succeed in bringing the enemy to battle, there was but little opportunity for personal distinction on the part of subordinate officers. I should mention, however, Brig. General B. R. Johnson for his fine march from Cloud's Creek to Bean's Station (about 16 miles over very bad roads), and for his handsome attack upon the enemy's cavalry, driving him steadily back. Brigadier-General Gracie (who was severely wounded) and Brigadier-General Kershaw for their very creditable parts in the same affair. Brigadier-General Jenkins for his vigorous pursuit from Lenoir's Station. Brigadier-Generals Anderson, Humphreys, and Bryan for their gallant assault on the enemy's fort at Knoxville on November 29. Colonel Ruff, of the Eighteenth Georgia Regiment, had command of Wofford's brigade in the same assault. He was killed at the ditch. He was a very promising officer, and is a great loss to the service and his country. In this assault Colonel McElroy, Thirteenth Mississippi Volunteers, and Colonel Thomas, Sixteenth Georgia Volunteers, also fell. Their bodies were afterward found in the ditch of the fort foremost in the attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Fiser, Seventeenth Mississippi, lost an arm after having mounted the parapet. Lieutenant Cumming, adjutant of the Sixteenth Georgia Volunteers,with great gallantry rushed up to the fort with 10 or 12 of his men, and made his way through an embrasure to the interior, where the party was finally captured. The conduct of Captain Foster, of Jenkins' brigade,who had charge of the select party thrown across the Tennessee on the night of November 13, was highly creditable, both as to the coolness of the officer and the skill with which his party was handled. Lieutenant-Colonel Logan had at various times through the campaign control of the line of skirmishers of Hood's division, and always managed it with courage and skill. The conduct of Captain Winthrop has already been noticed. The gallantry of this officer on the occasion referred to was most conspicuous, and had the happiest effect in leading the troops over the enemy's cover, at which they had faltered. Colonel Alexander, chief of artillery, is entitled to great credit for his untiring efforts and zeal throughout he campaign and during the siege. I desire to express my obligations to the officers of my staff-Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, Major Latrobe, Major Fairfax, Major Walton, Lieutenant Goree, Lieutenant Dunn, Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, and Captain Manning (signal officer)-for their usual assistance and attention. My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Dunn, was severely wounded in the leg during the siege of Knoxville. In the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, chief of ordnance, during the greater portion of the campaign, the affairs of his department were well conducted by his assistant, Lieutenant Dawson. Major Moses, chief commissary; Major Taylor, chief quartermaster; Captain Potts, assistant quartermaster, and Surgeons Cullen and Barksdale displayed their usual intelligence and energy in the administration of their respective departments. I refer to the reports of the chief commissary of subsistence and chief quartermaster for information in regard to the condition of their departments upon our arrival at Sweet Water; also to the accompanying copies of letters in explanation of our affairs at the beginning and during the progress of the campaign.
As the case of Brigadier-General Robertson has more or less important bearing upon the campaign,it should be mentioned in this report. As his division commander had made several complaints of his incompetency, it was suggested to me by higher authority that I should ask for a board of officers to examine and report upon his case. It was suggested at the same time that when he was relieved to attend the board another brigadier could be sent to the brigade. The board of officers was asked for by me and ordered by the commanding general; but the brigadier was left in command of the brigade. He seemed to exercise an injurious influence over the troops, and I was induced again to ask that he be relieved. An order was issued relieving the officer at my request. When the troops were started upon the campaign I found to my surprise that Brigadier-General Robertson had been ordered back to the command of his brigade. The letters and orders in the case are a part of this report. Brigadier-General Robertson is now in arrest under charges of a serious character.
Respectfully submitted.
JAMES LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding
HEADQUARTERS, November 16, 1863
General McLAWS
Commanding Division
GENERAL:
The enemy appears in full retreat, leaving in confusion and abandoning many of their wagons. The commanding general desires you to push on at once by the Campbell's Station road, communicating with us from time to time. Colonel J. R. Hart has some cavalry on the Knoxville road opposite Lenoir's, which you can use as you wish. You should move as quickly as possible.
Respectfully,
G. MOXLEY SORREL
Assistant Adjutant-General.
November 29, 1863 - According to an order to another Regiment from General Longstreet, the 6th was in Kingston on this date.
December 23, 1863 - Action at Hay's Ferry, near Dandridge -
Brig.-Gen. Sturgis, chief of cavalry of the Army of the Ohio,and by seniority commanding the cavalry of the Departments of the Ohio and Cumberland, detached the First Brigade of the First Division, Col. A. P.Campbell commanding, to march to Dandridge, in conjunction with some ofhis own cavalry, and cut off a rebel brigade supposed to be there. At Hay'sFerry Campbell briskly attacked the enemy, who, being heavily re-enforced,compelled him to retreat. On the retreat one gun of Lilly's (Eighteenth Indiana)battery was spiked and abandoned on account of an axle breaking. In this affairour loss was 7 killed, 47 wounded, and 7 missing. We captured 30 prisoners,besides killing Maj. Bale, of the Sixth Georgia Cavalry, and killing and wounding over 100 of the enemy